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Abstract  Central  Counterparties  (CCPs)  are  ﬁnancial  infrastructures  designed  to  reduce  coun-
terparty  risk.  They  do  so  by  virtue  of  novation  of  trades,  becoming  the  buyer  to  the  seller  and
the seller  to  the  buyer.  CCPs  manage  the  counterparty  risk  collecting  Margins  from  its  Members.
Interoperability  among  CCPs  allows  those  Members  that  maintain  positions  in  several  CCPs
(like big  investment  banks  or  HFTs)  to  concentrate  all  their  trades  in  one  CCP.  After  an  Inter-
operability  arrangement  is  implemented,  these  Members  can  reduce  their  total  exposure  by
netting long  and  short  positions,  thus  enjoying  a  reduction  in  the  Margins  they  have  to  post.
But Interoperability  reduces  the  Margins  for  some  Members  at  the  price  of  creating  new
risks for  the  whole  system.  These  new  risks  have  to  be  covered  with  Interoperability  Margins,
additional  to  the  Position-related  ones.  As  a  consequence,  Members  with  a  below-average  use
of Interoperability  --  like  local  Banks  or  ﬁnal  investors  --  will  suffer  an  increase  in  the  Margins
they have  to  post.
Interoperability  --  which  is  compulsory  in  Europe  by  virtue  of  EMIR  --  implies  a  transfer  of
capital from  local  Banks  and  ﬁnal  investors  to  big  Investment  Banks  and  HFTs.  The  rationale  for
defending such  a  policy  should  be  openly  discussed:  it  is  not  easy  to  realize  why  capital  in  the
hands of  HFTs  and  big  Investment  Banks  is  preferable  to  capital  in  the  hands  of  local  Banks  and
buy-side ﬁrms.
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Interoperabilidad  entre  entidades  de  contrapartida  central.  Impacto  sobre  la
distribución  del  consumo  de  capital  entre  los  miembros
Resumen  Las  entidades  de  contrapartida  central  (ECC)  son  infraestructuras  ﬁnancieras
disen˜adas para  reducir  el  riesgo  de  las  contrapartes  mediante  la  innovación  comercial,  con-
virtiéndose en  compradores  para  los  vendedores,  y  viceversa.  Las  ECC  gestionan  el  riesgo  de
las contrapartes,  recolectando  los  márgenes  procedentes  de  sus  miembros.
La interoperabilidad  entre  las  ECC  permite  que  aquellos  miembros  que  mantienen  posiciones
en diversas  ECC  (tales  como  los  grandes  bancos  de  inversión,  o  las  HFT)  puedan  concentrar  todas
sus operaciones  en  una  única  ECC.  Una  vez  que  se  introduce  un  acuerdo  de  interoperabilidad,
dichos miembros  pueden  reducir  su  exposición  al  compensar  sus  posiciones  a  largo  y  corto  plazo,
obteniendo  de  este  modo  una  reducción  de  los  márgenes  que  tienen  que  registrar.
Pero la  interoperabilidad  reduce  los  márgenes  de  algunos  miembros,  a  costa  de  crear  nuevos
riesgos para  el  sistema  en  general,  que  deben  cubrirse  con  los  márgenes  de  interoperabilidad,
además  de  los  márgenes  relativos  a  la  posición.  Como  consecuencia  de  ello,  los  miembros  que
utilicen una  interoperabilidad  por  debajo  de  la  media  --como  es  el  caso  de  los  bancos  locales  o
los inversores  ﬁnales--  experimentarán  un  incremento  de  los  márgenes  que  tienen  que  registrar.
La interoperabilidad  --que  es  obligatoria  en  Europa  en  virtud  de  la  normativa  EMIR--  implica  la
transferencia  de  capital  de  los  bancos  locales  e  inversores  ﬁnales  a  los  grandes  bancos  de  inver-
sión y  a  las  HFT.  Claramente,  deberá  analizarse  la  justiﬁcación  para  defender  dicha  política:  no
es fácil  comprender  por  qué  es  preferible  que  el  capital  esté  en  manos  de  las  HFT  y los  grandes
bancos, en  lugar  de  residir  en  los  bancos  locales  y  en  las  empresas  compradoras.
© 2016  Asociacio´n  Cuadernos  de  Economı´a.  Publicado  por  Elsevier  Espan˜a,  S.L.U.  Todos  los
derechos reservados.
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t. Introduction
entral  Counterparties  (CCPs)  are  ﬁnancial  infrastructures
esigned  to  reduce  counterparty  risk.  They  do  so  by  virtue
f  novation  of  trades,  becoming  the  buyer  to  the  seller  and
he  seller  to  the  buyer  and  protect  themselves  from  coun-
erparty  risk  by  collecting  Margins  from  its  Members.  In  the
uest  for  a  safer,  more  solid  ﬁnancial  framework  Central
ounterparties  (CCPs)  have  been  promoted  as  instruments
or  managing  counterparty  risk  in  ﬁnancial  markets.
In  Europe,  efﬁciency  and  competition  concerns  have
esulted  in  a  demand  for  Interoperability  among  CCPs.
uch  forces  have  crystalized  in  the  EMIR  Regulation,  which
akes  central  clearing  compulsory  for  many  ﬁnancial  instru-
ents  and,  at  the  same  time,  forces  European  CCPs  to
nter  into  interoperability  agreements  when  required  to
o  so.1
Without  Interoperability,  once  a  Member  has  cleared  a
rade  through  one  CCP,  such  trade  is  irrevocably  tied  to  that
peciﬁc  CCP.  This  situation  has  led  to  argue  that  each  CCP
as  a  monopoly  and  Interoperability  has  been  presented  as  a
ool  to  ﬁght  against  this  monopoly.  This  is  a  weak  argument,
hough:  a  monopoly  is  deﬁned  by  the  presence  or  absence  of
lose  substitutes.  If  there  are  several  CCPs  offering  the  same
nstrument,  it  is  obvious  that  there  are  close  substitutes.  If
1 EMIR, art.51.3. ‘‘Entering into an interoperability
rrangement. . . shall be rejected or restricted only in order
o control any risk arising from that arrangement’’.
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there  are  close  substitutes,  it  is  difﬁcult  to  defend  that  there
s  a monopoly.2
At  the  same  time,  some  Members  usually  trade  in  differ-
nt  trading  venues.  If  these  trading  venues  utilize  different
CPs,  the  Member  can  ﬁnd  itself  in  a  situation  where  a  long
osition  in  one  ﬁnancial  instrument  cannot  be  offset  against
 short  position  in  the  same  instrument  just  because  the
ong  and  short  positions  are  cleared  through  two  different
CPs.  This  not  only  increases  the  capital  requirement  for
he  Member,  which  has  to  post  double  collateral,  but  could
lso  increase  systemic  risk,  because  an  essentially  balanced
osition  is  treated  as  two  separate,  independent  positions.
Interoperability  among  CCPs  allows  Members  with  activ-
ty  in  several  trading  venues  to  consolidate  all  their  positions
n  just  one  CCP,  saving  capital  and  reducing  their  risks.  This
s  a  strong  argument  in  favour  of  interoperability  in  Europe.3
In  practical,  and  legal  terms,  Interoperability  means  that
he  interoperating  CCPs  become  a  kind  of  especial  Member
f  each  other.  When  one  of  the  Member  Banks  wants  to  trans-
er  its  position  from  one  CCP  to  the  other,  the  only  thing  to
o  is  for  the  Bank  to  move  such  position  to  the  account  of
he  corresponding  CCP  at  the  interoperated  CCP.
The  Bank  can  then  consolidate  all  its  positions  in  one
CP,  realizing  all  the  operational  and  cost  advantages  of  such
ntegration.  The  side  effect  is  that  the  CCPs  have  an  open
osition  among  them  that  can  be  a  source  of  systemic  risk.
2 It would be like defending that Ford has a monopoly because it
s the only manufacturer of the Fiesta model.
3 In the US, interoperability is not a pressing issue, probably due
o a different institutional setup.
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wInteroperability  between  Central  Counterparties  
European  Authorities  have  recognized  the  risk  of  systemic
disorders  associated  with  Interoperability  and  have  reacted
by  demanding  that  sufﬁcient  collateral  be  posted  between
the  interoperating  CCPs.  Such  guaranty  should  be  additional
to  Position  Margins,  pre-funded  and  ﬁnanced  by  the  Members
of  the  CCPs.4,5
Interoperability  has,  then,  two  opposing  effects  on  Total
Margins  to  be  posted  by  Members:  the  new  netting  opportu-
nities  reduce  Margins;  but,  at  the  same  time,  the  new  risks
posed  by  the  cross-CCPs  relationships  call  for  the  need  of  an
increase  in  Margins.
The  effect  on  Total  Margins  of  central  clearing  and  Inter-
operability  has  been  analyzed  in  several  papers,  like  Dufﬁe
and  Zhu  (2011)  or  Mägerle  and  Nellen  (2011).  One  common
ﬁnding  is  that  having  several  CCPs  for  the  same  instrument
can  reduce  the  efﬁciency  of  the  system,  measured  in  terms
of  the  amount  of  collateral  needed  to  cover  the  Margins
demanded  by  the  CCPs.  Interoperability  can  increase  the
efﬁciency  of  the  system,  but,  depending  on  the  precise
mechanism  chosen  to  deal  with  systemic  risk,  it  can  do  so  at
the  cost  of  an  overcollateralized  clearing  system,6 compared
to  the  situation  of  just  one  CCP.
The  effect  of  Interoperability  on  the  distribution  of  Mar-
gins  to  post  by  the  different  Members  has  been  less  analyzed
and  is,  precisely,  the  object  of  the  present  paper.  The  main
ﬁnding  is  that  Interoperability  is  not  neutral  in  the  distri-
bution  of  Margins  among  Members:  the  savings  of  collateral
are  concentrated  on  some  Members,  while  the  increases  in
Margins  have  to  be  borne  by  other  Members.  This  raises  con-
siderations  of  fairness  and,  in  more  general  terms,  on  the
impact  of  regulation.
The  present  paper,  which  is  an  extension  of  Mägerle  and
Nellen’s  (2011)  model,  develops  a  numeric  example  of  inter-
operability  between  two  CCPs,  focusing  on  the  distribution
of  Margins  among  Members.  The  example  is  developed  in
three  steps.  In  the  ﬁrst  step,  we  describe  the  market  before
Interoperability,  and  calculate  the  Margins  to  be  posted  by
each  Member  when  the  CCPs  are  independent  from  each
other.  In  the  second  step,  Interoperability  is  introduced
and  Margins  are  recalculated  for  this  new  situation.
Finally,  the  third  step  compares  Margins  before  and  after
Interoperability.
A  formal  presentation  of  the  model  is  included  in  the
Technical  Appendix.
2. A review of the relevant literature
Academic  interest  on  central  clearing  and  related  issues
gathered  momentum  when  the  G-20,  at  the  2009  Pittsburgh
Summit,  declared  mandatory  clearing  for  OTC  derivatives.
Since  then,  a  number  of  papers  have  been  published  on  this
topic,  analysing  the  impact  of  introducing  a  CCP  in  a  previ-
ously  bilaterally  cleared  market.  A  brief  reference  to  some
relevant  papers  on  interoperability  and  the  redistribution  of
collateral  consumption  among  Members  follows.
4 ESMA’s Guidelines and Recommendations (ESMA, 2013).
5 Implementation by the Bank of England of ESMA’s Guidelines and
Recommendations (Bank of England, 2015).
6 Mägerle and Nellen (2011).
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Applying  the  instruments  of  the  Theory  of  Industrial  Orga-
ization  to  ﬁnancial  markets,  Pirrong  (2007)  shows  that  the
mount  of  capital  needed  to  ensure  the  performance  of  a
CP  is  subadditive:  the  capital  required  for  the  performance
f  just  one  single  CCP  is  less  than  the  amount  needed  by  two
r  more  CCPs.  This  is  so  because  losses  from  a  CCP  default
an  be  described  as  an  option  on  a  portfolio.  The  subaddi-
ivity  comes  from  the  fact  that  an  option  on  a portfolio  is
ess  costly  than  a  portfolio  of  options.
In  Pirrong  (2011)  this  line  of  reasoning  is  extended
owards  the  conclusion  that  interoperability  among  CCPs
hat  are  clearing  the  same  instrument  can  be  desirable,
lthough  it  is  challenging  to  design  robust  interoperability
rrangements.  Further,  the  presence  of  heterogeneous  par-
icipants  will  most  likely  lead  to  a  redistribution  of  wealth
mong  Members.  In  this  context,  it  is  crucial  for  regulators
o  clearly  identify  the  market  failure  that  they  are  trying  to
ddress.
Dufﬁe  and  Zhu  (2011),  analysing  the  clearing  of  deriva-
ives,  illustrate  that  the  counterparty  risk  and  netting
nefﬁciency  in  the  clearing  system  of  OTC  derivatives  are
enerally  exacerbated  if  more  than  one  CCP  is  involved.
learing  the  different  classes  of  derivatives  in  a  single  CCP
s  more  efﬁcient,  from  the  point  of  view  of  collateral  con-
umption,  than  clearing  the  different  classes  in  different
CPs.  They  mention  that  interoperability  can  be  a  means  of
chieving  the  beneﬁts  of  joint  clearing,  provided  the  legal,
nancial  engineering,  and  business  hurdles  are  overcome.
n  their  paper,  Dufﬁe  and  Zhu  assume  that  all  the  market
articipants  have  the  same  distribution  of  positions.
Mägerle  and  Nellen  (2011), developing  a  model  that  is
he  basis  of  the  one  used  in  the  present  paper,  ﬁnd  that
nteroperability  achieves  optimal  netting  efﬁciency  similar
o  the  reference  case  of  a  single  CCP  by  enabling  multilateral
etting  across  all  participants  of  linked  CCPs.  They  demon-
trate  that  interoperability  minimizes  Margins  requirements
nd  counterparties  exposures  in  the  clearing  system.  But,
t  the  same  time,  they  conﬁrm  regulator’s  concerns  about
ystemic  risk,  because  multilateral  interoperability  arrange-
ents  are  generally  prone  to  undercollateralization.  The
dditional  collateral  required  to  eliminate  the  risk  of  conta-
ion  brings  about  a  certain  degree  of  overcollateralization  in
he  clearing  system.  Mägerle  and  Nellen,  with  an  approach
imilar  to  Dufﬁe  and  Zhu,  assume  in  their  model  that  all  the
arket  participants  make  use  of  interoperability  and  that
hey  are  homogeneous  among  them.7
Garratt  and  Zimmerman  (2015)  extend  the  work  of  Dufﬁe
nd  Zhu  by  considering  general  cases  of  network  structures.
nstead  of  considering  that  all  dealers  are  ex  ante  the  same,
arratt  and  Zimmerman  design  a  model  with  a  more  realistic
etwork,  including  several  well-connected  nodes  together
ith  a  larger  number  of  poorly  connected  participants.  They
nalyze  both  the  expected  exposure  and  the  variance  of  the
et  exposures  and  ﬁnd  that  depending  on  the  number  of
sset  classes  relative  to  the  number  of  dealers,  introducing
 CCP  can  either  increase  both  the  mean  and  the  variance,
educe  both  or  have  opposite  effects  on  the  mean  and  the
7 This is precisely the assumption modiﬁed in the present paper,
here we explicitly introduce a higher degree of heterogeneity
mong Members.
1v
ﬁ
P
i
o
m
f
c
t
i
s
d
s
T
o
c
m
a
a
t
p
c
t
m
a
t
a
M
o
i
W
a
t
3
T
1
2
3
4
g
d
l
t
p
p
v
C
M
i
a
a
p
t
7
M
c
A
O
i
a
a
m
e
g
M
9
o
C
t
s
4
S
A
M
c
A
l
a)  Member  1  transfers  its  short  position  at  CCP-B  to  the
account  opened  in  this  CCP  by  CCP-A.  From  CCP-B’s30  
ariance,  leading  to  a  trade-off.  Garratt  and  Zimmerman
nd  situations  that  could  be  socially  efﬁcient  but  are  not
areto-efﬁcient.  This  could  explain  why  market  participants
n  OTC  markets  have  not  agreed  upon  central  clearing  and
pens,  like  in  Pirrong’s  work,  the  question  of  exactly  what
arket  failure  is  the  regulator  trying  to  address.  In  a  dif-
erent  context  and  with  a  different  model,  some  of  the
onclusions  of  Garratt  and  Zimmerman  are  also  reached  in
he  present  paper.
Heath,  Kelly,  and  Manning  (2013)  approach  the  problem
n  a  different  way.  They  take  into  consideration  the  con-
umption  of  collateral  (high-quality  liquid  assets)  that  the
ifferent  alternative  setups  bring  about  and  the  impact  of
uch  consumption  on  the  Balance  Sheets  of  the  Members.
hey  do  so  in  the  context  of  a  core-periphery  model.  One
f  their  ﬁndings  is  that  the  beneﬁts  of  netting  and  central
learing  accrue  disproportionately  to  the  core  banks.  The
odel  of  the  present  paper  conﬁrms  this  conclusion.
From  a  completely  different  point  of  view,  ESMA  (2013)
nalyses  the  systemic  risk  implications  of  interoperability
rrangements  and  puts  forward  the  guidelines  to  contain
hem.  Bank  of  England  (2015)  develops  the  guidelines  into  a
ractical  implementation  policy  reference.
Finally,  ESMA  (2016)  is  a  balanced  analysis  of  the  impli-
ations  of  interoperability,  enjoying  the  beneﬁt  of  access
o  actual  data  of  the  interoperability  arrangements  imple-
ented  in  Europe.
It  has  to  be  pointed  out  that  while  the  actual  interoper-
bility  arrangements  implemented  in  Europe  are  restricted
o  money  market  or  cash  instruments,  most  of  the  academic
nalyses  have  referred  to  the  case  of  derivatives.  Except  for
ägerlle  and  Nellen’s,  there  are  not  many  academic  analyses
n  interoperability  for  cash  instruments.
In  the  next  sections,  we  present  a  numeric  example  of
nteroperability  between  two  CCPs  for  cash  instruments.
e  will  focus  on  the  distribution  of  collateral  consumption
mong  Members.  The  ﬁrst  step  in  the  analysis  is  to  describe
he  situation  before  interoperability  is  implemented.
. Initial situation before Interoperability
he  situation  before  Interoperability  is  the  following:
.  There  are  two  separate  CCPs,  namely  CCP-A  and  CCP-
B,  both  clearing  the  same  ﬁnancial  instrument  --  cash
equity.
.  Each  of  the  two  CCPs  has  its  own  set  of  Members.  Each
Member  clears  only  at  one  CCP,  except  for  Member  1,  who
is  Member  of  and  maintains  positions  at  the  two  CCPs.
Thus,  Member  1  is  the  candidate  to  beneﬁt  from  the
Interoperability  Arrangement  once  it  is  implemented.
This  simpliﬁed  setup  highlights  the  impact  of  Interop-
erability  without  any  signiﬁcant  loss  of  accuracy.
.  There  are  ﬁve  groups  of  Members:
•  Members  of  CCP-A  holding  net  long  positions;
•  Members  of  CCP-A  holding  net  short  positions;
•  Members  of  CCP-B  holding  net  long  positions;
•  Members  of  CCP-B  holding  net  short  positions;
•  and,  ﬁnally,  Member  1,  who  maintains  a  long  position
at  CCP-A  and  a  short  one  at  CCP-B.J.J.  Massa
.  Margins  are  calculated  as  a  percentage  (arbitrarily  set
at  10%)  of  the  positions  held  by  Members.  Both  CCPs
are  assumed  to  maintain  the  same  margining  policy.  As
Margins  are  necessary  to  cover  the  risk  of  adverse  price
movements,  they  are  calculated  on  the  absolute  value
of  the  position;  to  further  simplify  the  example,  the
same  probability  is  assigned  to  increases  and  decreases  of
prices.8 This  simpliﬁcation  does  not  affect  the  generality
of  the  conclusions.
The  value  of  the  initial  positions  and  the  associated  Mar-
ins  are  shown  in  Table  1. Short  positions  (obligation  to
eliver  securities)  are  represented  as  negative  ﬁgures,  while
ong  positions  (obligation  to  receive  and  pay  for  securi-
ies)  are  presented  as  positive.  The  sum  of  long  and  short
ositions  at  each  CCP  equals  zero,  showing  the  balanced
osition  of  the  CCP:  it  only  buys  if  simultaneously  sells  and
ice  versa.
Part  (a)  of  Table  1  contains  the  initial  position  at  CCP-A.
olumn  (1)  presents  the  positions  of  the  different  Members:
ember  1  is  long  1000,  the  rest  of  Members  with  long  pos-
tions  are  long  9000  and  the  Members  with  short  positions
re  short  (minus)  10,000.  Margins  for  each  group,  presented
t  column  (2),  are  10%  of  these  ﬁgures.
Part  (b)  of  Table  1  has  the  same  columns  and  contains  the
ositions  at  CCP-B,  where  Member  1  is  short  (minus)  900,
he  rest  of  Members  with  short  positions  are  short  (minus)
100  and  the  Members  with  long  positions  add  up  to  8000.
argins  are,  again,  10%  of  these  ﬁgures  and  are  presented  in
olumn  (2).
Finally,  the  Table  presents  the  Open  Position  at  each  CCP.
t  CCP-A  it  is  20,000,  while  at  CCP-B,  it  amounts  to  16,000.
pen  Position  is  the  sum  of  the  absolute  value  of  the  pos-
tions  and  is  the  basis  for  the  calculation  of  risks.  Margins
re,  in  fact,  a  percentage  of  Open  Position.  Open  Position  is
lso  called  Open  Interest;  both  expressions  have  the  same
eaning.
Table  2  is  a  summary  of  the  Margins  to  be  covered  by
ach  Member.  It  presents  the  information  on  Table  1  aggre-
ated  for  the  two  CCPs  analyzed.  Member  1  has  to  contribute
argins  to  both  CCPs,  for  a  total  of  190:  100  at  CCP-A  plus
0  at  CCP-B.  The  rest  of  Members,  clearing  only  through
ne  CCP,  have  to  contribute  Margins  only  to  their  respective
CP.  Without  Interoperability,  total  Margins  contributed  by
he  whole  market  amount  to  3600.  CCP-A  receives  2000  of
uch  total,  while  1600  go  to  CCP-B.
. Situation after Interoperability
uppose  that  CCP-A  and  CCP-B  enter  into  an  Interoperability
rrangement,  duly  authorized  and  properly  implemented.
ember  1  can  now  make  use  of  the  new  Arrangement  and
oncentrate  all  its  positions  in  its  CCP  of  choice,  say  in  CCP-
.  For  this  concentration  to  effectively  occur,  the  following
egal  movements  have  to  take  place:point  of  view,  then,  the  counterparty  of  this  position
8 Following Mägerle and Nellen (2011).
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Table  1  Initial  Positions  without  Interoperability.
Initial  Position  (1)  Margins  to  deposit  (2)
Part  (a).  Positions  and  Margins  at  CCP-A
Member  1  1000  100
Members of  CCP-A  with  long  positions  9000  900
Members of  CCP-A  with  short  positions  −10,000  1000
Total CCP-A  0  2000
Open position  at  CCP-A  20,000
Part (b).  Positions  and  Margins  at  CCP-B
Member  1  −900  90
Members of  CCP-B  with  long  positions 8000  800
Members of  CCP-B  with  short  positions −7100 710
Total  CCP-B 0  1600
Open position  at  CCP-B  16,000
Table  2  Summary:  Margins  to  deposit  without  Interoperability.
Margins  at  CCP-A  (1a) Margins  at  CCP-B  (1b)  Total  margins  (3)
Member  1  100  90  190
Members of  CCP-A  with  long  positions  900  -  900
Members of  CCP-A  with  short  positions  1000  --  1000
Members of  CCP-B  with  long  positions  --  800  800
Members of  CCP-B  with  short  positions  --  710  710
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has  changed  to  CCP-A.  Member  1  needs  no  longer  be  a
Member  of  CCP-B.
)  CCP-A  simultaneously  books  the  short  position  at  Mem-
ber  1’s  account  in  CCP-A.  With  all  the  long  and  short
positions  in  the  same  clearing  account,  Member  1  can
consolidate  them  and  have  its  account  at  CCP-A  reﬂect
its  true,  reduced  position.
c)  To  keep  its  balance,  CCP-A  books  an  opposing  position  at
CCP-B’s  account.  From  CCP-A’s  point  of  view,  the  position
recognized  to  Member  1’s  account  is  compensated  by  an
opposing  position  held  by  CCP-B.  This  CCP-B’s  position  at
CCP-A  mirrors  the  position  of  CCP-A  at  CCP-B  mentioned
in  a)  above.
European  Authorities  have  realized  that  the  crossing  of
positions  between  interoperating  CCPs  increases  the  risk
of  contagion  from  one  CCP  to  the  other  should  a  problem
appear  in  one  of  them.  To  contain  the  spreading  of  conta-
gion  --  systemic  risk  --  European  Authorities9 have  imposed
on  interoperating  CCPs  the  obligation  to  cross-margin  each
other  applying  their  respective  standard  margining  proce-
dures.  Such  crossed  Margins  have  to  be  pre-funded,  ﬁnanced
by  the  Members  and  additional  to  the  standard  position  Mar-
gins.  In  practical  terms  and  referred  to  the  example,  it
means  that  CCP-A  has  to  collect  additional  Margins  from  its
Members  to  post  them  at  CCP-B  and  that  CCP-B  has  to  ask  its
Members  for  extra  Margins  to  cover  the  demand  from  CCP-A.
These  extra  Margins  are  the  Interoperability  Margin.
9 As mentioned in Notes 4 and 5 above.
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Total  Margins  under  Interoperability  are,  then,  composed
f  two  addends:
.  Margins  from  Position,  which  in  the  example  are  a  direct
percentage  of  the  Open  Position  of  each  Member,  plus
.  The  part  of  the  Interoperability  Margin  allocated  to  each
Member.
Each  addend  is  analyzed  separately  in  the  following  para-
raphs,  before  ﬁnding  the  total.
.1.  Margins  from  Position
able  3  presents  the  situation  at  both  CCPs  after  Member  1
as  made  use  of  the  Interoperability  Arrangement,  concen-
rating  all  its  positions  in  CCP-A.  The  table  has  two  parts:
art  (a)  on  the  upper  half,  presents  the  positions  at  CCP-A;
art  (b),  on  the  lower  half,  reﬂects  the  positions  at  CCP-B.
The  ﬁrst  column10 in  Table  3  is  just  the  Initial  Posi-
ion  before  interoperability,  presented  at  Table  1  as  column
1).  The  second  column,  labelled  Effect  of  Interoperabil-
ty,  (4),  includes  the  movements  of  positions  implied  by
nteroperability:  reduction  of  Member  1’s  position  at  CCP-
,  compensated  by  a  ‘‘new’’  position  booked  at  CCP-A’s
ccount;  and  booking  of  the  interoperated  position  in  Mem-
er  1’s  account  at  CCP-A,  balanced  by  the  registration
f  the  opposite  position  at  CCP-B’s  account  in  CCP-A.
10 The number of each column is maintained throughout the paper,
o facilitate tracking the different ﬁgures presented.
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Table  3  After  Interoperability,  Member  1  concentrates  all  its  positions  in  CCP-A.
Initial
Position  (1)
Effect  of
Interop.  (4)
Final
Position  (5)
Margins  from
Position  (6)
Part  (a).  Positions  and  Margins  at  CCP-A
Member  1  1000  −900  100  10
Members of  CCP-A  with  long  positions  9000  --  9000  900
Members of  CCP-A  with  short  positions  −10,000  --  −10,000  1000
CCP-B 0  900  900  90
Total CCP-A  0  0  0  2000
Open position  at  CCP-A  20,000  20,000
Part (b).  Positions  and  Margins  at  CCP-B
Member  1 −900 900  0  0
Members of  CCP-B  with  long  positions 8000  -- 8000  800
Members of  CCP-B  with  short  positions  −7100  --  −7100  710
CCP-A 0  −900  −900  90
Total CCP-B 0  0  0  1600
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90  × 10
10  +  900  +  1000 = 1
11 For instance, EuroCCP’s Regulation of the Interoperability Fund
states: ‘‘1.2. Percentage per Clearing Participant. The percentage
which will be allocated to each Clearing Participant as referred
to in paragraph 7.2.3 (b) of the Clearing Rule Book will be deter-
mined as follows: The average Margin based on the previous thirty
(30) Clearing Days of the Clearing Participant’s Open Positions in
Securities which can be settled through the Co-operating Clearing
Houses divided by the average Margin based on the previous thirty
(30) Clearing Days of all Open Positions in Securities which can be
settled through the Co-operating Clearing Houses. This calculation
is performed on a monthly basis by EuroCCP at the beginning ofOpen position  at  CCP-B 16,000  
nteroperability  used  by  just  one  Member  does  not  affect
he  Total  Open  Position  at  either  CCP.
Column  (5)  presents  the  Final  Position  of  each  group  of
embers  at  the  two  CCP’s.  The  only  difference  with  the
ositions  before  interoperability  appears  in  Member  1  --  not
urprisingly,  as  it  is  the  Member  transferring  the  position
-  and  in  the  appearance  of  CCP-B  as  position  holder  at
CP-B  and,  correspondingly,  of  CCP-A  as  position  holder
n  CCP-B  for  exactly  the  same  amount.  This  cross-position
etween  the  two  CCP’s  is,  in  fact,  the  means  and  the  con-
equence  of  Member  1  making  use  of  Interoperability.
The  ﬁnal  column  (6)  is  the  direct  calculation  of  Margins  to
e  covered  by  Members  related  to  their  respective  positions.
hey  are  calculated  as  10%  of  the  Final  Position,  following
he  simple  margining  model  used  in  this  example.
Column  (6)  includes  Margins  to  be  posted  by  CCP-B  at
CP-A  and  by  CCP-A  at  CCP-B.  As  each  CCP  maintains  a  posi-
ion  at  the  other,  it  should  be  subject  to  the  same  margining
ules  than  all  the  Members,  to  keep  the  CCP  protected  and
o  contain  systemic  risk.  In  terms  of  the  example,  it  means
hat  some  allocation  rule  has  to  be  applied:  Members  of  CCP-
 have  to  ﬁnance  among  them  the  90  that  this  CCP  have  to
eposit  at  CCP-A;  and,  in  parallel,  the  Members  of  CCP-A
ave  to  ﬁnance  the  90  that  this  CCP  has  to  constitute  at  CCP-
.  As  the  Interoperated  Open  Position  is  obviously  the  same
nd  as  both  CCPs  are  applying  the  same  margining  model,
he  Interoperability  Margin  to  be  crossed  between  the  two
CPs  is  the  same  in  both  directions.
.2.  Interoperability  Margin
CPs  allocate  the  Interoperability  Margin  to  its  Members  fol-
owing  a  proportionality  rule.  The  Interoperability  Margin
o  be  transferred  to  the  interoperating  CCP  is  ﬁnanced  by
embers  proportionally  to  their  respective  weight  on  Open
ositions  on  Securities  clearable  through  the  Interoperability
greement.
The  allocation  rule  utilized  in  this  example  is  very  sim-
le:  each  CCP  allocates  the  Interoperability  Margin  among
ts  Members  proportionally  to  the  Position  Margins  of  each
e
(
ﬁ
f16,000
ember.  This  allocation  rule  is  a  fair  representation  of  the
ules  actually  applied  by  CCPs  in  the  real  world.11
The  allocation  rule  means  that  every  Member  will  have  to
onstitute  Deposits  additional  to  the  pure  position-related
nes  previously  calculated  in  Table  3. The  calculation  of
hese  extra  Margins  and  its  allocation  among  the  differ-
nt  Members  are  presented  in  Table  4.  This  Table,  again,
ncludes  in  the  upper  half,  Part  (a),  the  situation  at  CCP-A,
hile  the  lower  half,  Part  (b),  presents  the  calculations  for
CP-B.
The  actual  calculations  for  allocating  the  Interoperability
argin  are  very  simple.
In the  case  of  CCP-A,  the  Interoperability  Margin  to  allo-
ate  is  90.  The  Margins  from  Position  for  the  different  groups
f  Members  are,  as  per  Table  3,  10  for  Member  1,  900  for
he  Members  with  long  positions  and  1000  for  the  Members
ith  short  positions.  The  allocation  of  the  Interoperability
argin  is,  then:
)  Member  1ach month. Reporting of the percentage will be done within two
2) Clearing Days after the calculation, but always within the ﬁrst
ve (5) Clearing Days of each month. The percentages will apply as
rom the ﬁrst Monday following reporting.’’ (EuroCCP, 2014).
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Table  4  Margins  to  Deposit  after  Interoperability.
Margins  from
Position  (6)
Allocation  of
Interoperability  Margin  (7)
Margins  after
Interop.  (8)
Part  (a).  Margins  at  CCP-A
Member  1  10  1  11
Members of  CCP-A  with  long  positions  900  42  942
Members of  CCP-A  with  short  positions  1000  47  1047
From CCP-B  90  --  90
To CCP-B  --  −90  −90
Total CCP-A  2000  0  2000
Part (b).  Margins  at  CCP-B
Member  1 0  0  0
Members of  CCP-B  with  long  positions 800  48  848
Members of  CCP-B  with  short  positions  710  42  752
From CCP-A  90  --  90
To CCP-A --  −90  −90
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)  Members  with  long  positions
90  × 900
10  +  900  +  1000 = 42
c)  Members  with  short  positions
90  × 1000
10  +  900  +  1000 = 47
In  the  case  of  CCP-B,  the  Interoperability  Margin  to  allo-
cate  is  90.  The  Margins  from  Position  for  the  group  of
Members  with  short  positions  are  710,  as  per  Table  3.  The
Members  with  long  positions  have  to  post  800.  The  allocation
of  the  Interoperability  Margin  is:
a)  Members  with  short  positions:
90  × 710
710  +  800 =  42
b)  Members  with  long  positions:
90  × 800
710  +  800 =  48
These  calculations  are  included  in  Table  4. The  ﬁrst  col-
umn  in  Table  4,  marked  (6),  is  simply  a  reproduction  of  the
last  column  of  Table  3  and  reﬂects  the  position-related  Mar-
gins  to  post  by  each  Member.  This  column  includes  the  Margin
that  each  CCP  has  to  post  to  the  other  (90  each  in  the  exam-
ple).  The  second  column  distributes  this  last  amount  among
the  Members  of  each  CCP,  applying  the  allocation  rule,  with
the  ﬁgures  rounded  to  the  nearest  integer.  In  this  column,
the  Margin  to  post  at  the  other  CCP  is  presented  with  a
minus  sign,  to  reﬂect  the  fact  that  these  assets  will  be  trans-
ferred  precisely  to  the  other  CCP.  The  third  and  ﬁnal  column
(8)  is  the  horizontal  sum  of  the  Position  Margin  plus  the
u
t
o0  1600
nteroperability  Margin  and  is  the  total  guarantee  to  provide
y  each  Member  to  the  corresponding  CCP.
.  Comparison: before and after
nteroperability
nteroperability  changes  the  distribution  of  Margins  among
embers.  Table  5  presents  this  re-distribution  among  Mem-
ers  in  the  case  of  the  example  of  CCP-A  and  CCP-B.
Table  5  presents  in  two  columns  the  Margins  to  be  covered
y  Members  before  and  after  Interoperability.  The  column
‘Margins  before  Interoperability’’,  marked  (3),  comes  from
able  2  and  includes  the  Margins  to  be  covered  by  each  Mem-
er  before  the  two  CCPs  entered  into  the  Interoperability
rrangement.  Member  1  had  to  post  190  in  collateral;  all  the
ther  Members  of  CCP-A  had  to  cover  1900  (=900  +  1000);
nd  the  rest  of  CCP-B’s  Members  had  to  deposit  1510
=800  +  710).
The  second  column,  marked  (8),  comes  from  Table  4.  It
ncludes  the  Margins  to  be  covered  by  each  Member  after  the
wo  CCPs  have  entered  into  their  Interoperability  Arrange-
ent  and  Member  1  has  made  use  of  it,  concentrating  all
ts  positions  in  CCP-A.  In  this  new  institutional  setup,  with
he  two  CCPs  linked  to  each  other,  Member  1’s  Margin  has
educed  to  11;  the  rest  of  CCP-A’s  Members  have  to  post  1989
=942  +  1047);  and  all  the  other  Members  of  CCP-B  have  to
ost  1600  (=848  +  752).
The  third  column,  (9),  is  the  difference  between  the
revious  two  columns.  It  is  calculated  as  ‘‘Margins  After’’
inus  ‘‘Margins  Before’’.  Thus,  a  negative  sign  in  this  col-
mn  means  that  the  corresponding  Member  is  enjoying  a
eduction  in  Margins  (Margins  After  are  minor  than  Mar-
ins  Before).  A  positive  sign  in  this  column  means  that  the
ffected  Member  has  to  post  more  collateral  after  Interop-
rability.  In  the  example,  Member  1  --  the  Member  that  made
se  of  Interoperability  --  saves  179  in  collateral  (equivalent
o  94%  of  its  total  before).
The  rest  of  Members  of  CCP-A  face  an  increase  in  Margins
f  89  (=42  +  47)  while  the  rest  of  Members  of  CCP-B  have  to
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Table  5  Comparison  of  Margins  to  deposit  before  and  after  Interoperability.
Margins  before
Interop.  (3)
Margins  after
Interop.  (8)
Difference  (minus  sign
means  reduction)  (9)
Member  1  190  11  −179
Members of  CCP-A  with  long  positions  900  942  42
Members of  CCP-A  with  short  positions  1000  1047  47
Members of  CCP-B  with  long  positions  800  848  48
Members of  CCP-B  with  short  positions  710  752  42
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ncrease  their  deposits  in  90  (=48  +  42)  as  compared  to  the
ituation  prior  to  Interoperability.  The  savings  of  Member  1
re  exactly  equal  to  the  extra  Margins  called  on  the  rest  of
embers.  In  other  words:  the  rest  of  Members  ﬁnance  the
avings  of  the  Member  making  use  of  Interoperability.
Particularly  worth  of  attention  is  the  situation  of  the
embers  remaining  at  CCP-B  (the  CCP  ‘‘losing’’  the  posi-
ion).  As  their  CCP  has  to  post  (new)  Margins  to  CCP-A,  these
embers  have  to  provide  more  collateral  just  because  Mem-
er  1  has  decided  to  move  its  position  to  a  different  CCP
hrough  Interoperability.  This  conclusion  is  very  robust  and
s  not  dependant  on  the  example  used.
Members  can  only  escape  the  negative  impact  of  Inter-
perability  by  making  use  of  it,  reaching  a  level  of  savings
uch  that  they  get  a  reduction  in  Margins  higher  than  the
ncrease  caused  by  the  emergence  of  the  Interoperability
argin.  Members  who  are  active  in  only  one  market,  or  do
ot  maintain  signiﬁcant  offsetting  positions  (buy-side  ﬁrms),
r  are  not  big  enough  to  become  Members  of  several  CCPs,
re  forced  to  provide  more  collateral  as  a  consequence  of
nteroperability.
In  the  real  world,  Interoperability  is  not  a  one-movement,
ne-player  game:  each  and  every  Member  can  make  use  of
t,  concentrating  all  its  positions  in  one  CCP,  netting  them
s  much  as  possible,  thus  minimizing  collateral  claims.  But,
ach  movement  by  a  different  Member  will  produce  exactly
he  same  kind  of  consequences  just  described:  that  partic-
lar  Member  will  enjoy  a  reduction  in  collateral  and  will
ffect  the  cross-CCP  Open  Position  and  the  Interoperabil-
ty  Margin  accordingly.  The  ﬁnal  effect  of  all  this  moves  by
ll  Members  is  not  straightforward  to  estimate.  It  depends
n  three  things:  the  relative  size  of  the  Members  affected;
he  percentage  of  netting  achieved  by  each  of  them  (with
reater  beneﬁts  for  the  Members  with  higher  offsetting  pos-
tions);  and  the  balancing  effects  of  the  positions  being
ransferred  from  one  CCP  to  the  other,  that  is,  the  size  of  the
nteroperability  Margin.  The  Technical  Appendix  gives  some
urther  insights  on  these  aspects.
. Conclusions of the comparison
he  main  conclusions  of  the  simple  example  presented  are
he  following:. Each  Member  making  use  of  the  Interoperability  Arrange-
ment  saves  Margins  proportionally  to  the  netting  effect
materialized.  This  is  accompanied  by  an  increase  in  the
Margins  to  be  posted  by  the  rest  of  Members.
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.  With  just  one  Member  interoperating,  it  is  a zero-sum
game:  the  gain  of  one  player  is  exactly  equal  to  the  loss
of  the  other  players.
.  When  several  Members  make  use  of  Interoperability,  each
of  them  will  beneﬁt  from  the  netting-related  savings  and
will  have  to  contribute  to  the  Interoperability  Margin.
The  ﬁnal  impact  on  each  Member  will  depend  on  its  own
size,  its  own  netting  percentage  and  the  total  size  of  the
Interoperability  Margin.
.  At  the  end,  some  Members  will  gain  and  others  will  lose.
Interoperability  will  change  the  distribution  of  Margins
among  Members.  Not  much  can  be  said  in  general  terms
about  the  speciﬁc  shape  of  such  redistribution,  except
that  Members  with  a  netting  percentage  above  the  aver-
age  will  win  and  Members  whose  netting  ratio  is  below
the  average  will  lose.  With  this  information,  we  can  make
a  guess  on  likely  winners  and  likely  losers:
•  Likely  winners:  Members  very  active  in  several  trading
venues  with  big  netting  opportunities.  This  points  to
HFTs,  big  international  Investment  Banks,  and  hedge
funds.  ‘‘Core  banks’’,  in  other  words.
•  Likely  losers:  players  not  having  signiﬁcant  offsetting
opportunities.  This  points  to  small  Brokers,  local  Mem-
bers  and  ﬁnal  investors,  i.e.  ‘‘Periphery  participants’’.
As  Interoperability  implies  a  transfer  of  capital  from
osers  to  winners,  it  is  not  a  Pareto-optimal  solution:  the
ains  for  some  Members  are  achieved  at  the  expense  of  other
embers,  whose  situation  is  worsened.  In  this  sense,  Inter-
perability  is  not  a  solution  that  is  unambiguously  better
han  the  alternatives.
. Final remarks
nteroperability  brings  about  winners  and  losers  and  a  redis-
ribution  of  capital  among  Members.  Why  are  European
uthorities  promoting  it?
One  possible  rational  answer  is  that  capital  in  the  hands
f  HFTs,  big  Investment  Banks  and  Hedge  Funds  is  socially
referred  to  capital  in  the  hands  of  Local  Banks  and  Final
nvestors.  This  idea  is,  to  say  the  least,  debatable.
It  can  be  expressed  in  a  different  way:  if  the  only  rea-
on  for  legally  enforcing  Interoperability  is  the  increase  in
fﬁciency,  it  is  a  wrong  argument.  In  fact,  even  if  Interop-
rability  reduced  Total  Margins  to  be  posted  by  the  whole
arket,  it  does  so  at  the  price  of  having  some  Mem-
ers  worsening  their  position.  This  is  not  an  efﬁciency
mprovement  in  the  traditional  economic  sense.  It  implies
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a  redistribution  of  wealth  among  participants  that  can  only
be  justiﬁed  if  either  the  social  cost  of  the  market  fail-
ure  being  addressed  is  high  enough  or  if  the  proﬁts  of
the  winners  have  more  social  value  than  the  losses  of  the
losers.
Something  to  remember  is  that  Members  making  use  of
Interoperability  have  positions  in  several  CCPs  because  they
have  found  it  proﬁtable  to  do  so.  They  have  not  been  forced
to  trade  at  different  trading  venues  by  the  legislation  or
in  pursuit  of  the  social  good;  they  have  traded  at  different
trading  venues  because  it  maximizes  their  private  proﬁts.
No  doubt,  Interoperability  will  increase  the  proﬁtability  of
such  operations,  but  at  an  opportunity  cost.  Interoperability
is  not  a  free  lunch.
This  cost  is  paid  by  the  smaller,  local,  buy-side  Members
who  have  to  come  up  with  more  capital.  For  these  Mem-
bers,  Interoperability  is  not  necessarily  a  winning  operation:
they  have  to  bear  the  cost  of  extra  capital  consumption  and
added  systemic  risk  in  exchange  for  facilitating  the  opera-
tions  of  the  big  Members.
The  main  conclusion  is  that  Interoperability  desirable
effects  do  not  come  about  for  free:  they  have  consequences
on  the  distribution  of  capital  consumption  among  Members.
This  is  not  a  minor  consequence  that  can  be  lightly  disre-
garded:  the  level  of  capital  is  now  one  of  the  most  sensitive
topics  in  the  banking  industry.  By  affecting  the  distribu-
tion  of  capital  among  Members,  Interoperability  is  improving
the  competitive  position  of  a  selected  group  of  Members
while  worsening  the  position  of  all  the  other  market  par-
ticipants.  This  consideration  should  be  included  as  one  of
the  valid  legal  reasons  for  rejecting  an  Interoperability
Arrangement.
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Appendix A. Technical appendix
This  appendix  includes  an  outline  of  the  model  underly-
ing  the  example  presented  in  this  paper.  This  model  is  an
extension  of  Mägerle  and  Nellen’s  (2011). The  main  dif-
ference  is  that  in  the  present  version  of  the  model  we
explicitly  allow  for  different  kinds  of  participants  in  each
CCP,  looking  for  impacts  on  the  distribution  of  Margins  among
Members.  This  idea  is  present  in  Heath,  Kelly,  and  Manning
(2013)  with  their  core-periphery  description;  Pirrong  (2007,
2011),  in  the  context  of  derivatives  clearing,  also  analyses
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learing  setups  with  different  kinds  of  participants,  which
e  labels  ‘‘heterogeneity’’.  Garratt  and  Zimmerman  (2015)
evelop  a  similar  setup,  in  the  context  of  a realistic  ﬁnancial
etwork.
Like  Mägerle  and  Nellen’s,  this  model  considers  CCP
learing  of  a  cash  instrument,  which  is  the  case
or  the  Interoperability  links  actually  implemented  in
urope.
The  structure  of  the  market  deﬁned  for  the  model  is  the
ollowing:
.  There  are  two  CCPs,  CCP-A  and  CCP-B,  both  clearing  the
same  cash  instrument.
.  CCP-A  has  K  Members,  while  CCP-B  has  R  Members.
.  The  CCPs  have  some  Members  in  common:
a  Members  from  1  to  na have  positions  in  both  CCPs
and  will  concentrate  all  their  positions  at  CCP-A,  once
interoperability  is  implemented.
b  Members  from  na+1 to  nb also  maintain  positions  at  both
CCPs  and  will  move  all  their  positions  into  CCP-B  once
the  interoperability  arrangement  is  in  place.
c  Members  from  nb+1 to  nK work  only  with  CCP-A  and  they
will  continue  clearing  only  with  CCP-A  after  interop-
erability.
d  Members  from  nK+1 to  nR work  only  with  CCP-B  and  they
will  continue  clearing  only  with  CCP-B.
In  this  technical  appendix,  we  analyze  the  situation  of
ne  of  the  Members,  generically  identiﬁed  as  Member  i.
his  Member  will  make  use  of  Interoperability  once  it  is
stablished  and  will  concentrate  all  its  positions  at  CCP-A.
.1.  Situation  before  Interoperability
et  xm,i be  the  mth  transaction  of  Member  i  at  CCP-A.  Long
ositions  (obligation  to  receive  the  security  and  pay  in  cash
or  it)  are  presented  with  positive  sign,  while  short  positions
obligation  to  deliver  the  security)  have  negative  sign.  Then,
f  Member  i has  entered  into  a  total  of  Ti transactions,  we
ave  that
i =
Ti∑
m=1
xm,i (1)
Xi is  the  net  position  at  CCP-A  of  Member  i,  which  can  be
ositive  or  negative.
If    (0  <    <  1)  is  the  rate  applied  to  the  position  for  cal-
ulating  the  Margins  and  denoting  by  CMAi the  Margins  to  be
osted  by  Member  i  at  CCP-A,  we  have:
MAi =    · |Xi| (2)
That  is,  Margins  to  be  posted  by  Member  i  at  CCP-A  are
he  product  of  the  absolute  value  of  the  positions  at  that
CP,  multiplied  by  .
Doing  the  same  for  CCP-B,  and  denoting  by  yl,i the  lth
ransaction  of  Member  i  at  CCP-B:
Li∑
i =
l=1
yl,i (3)
here  Yi is  the  net  position  at  CCP-B  of  Member  i.  Again,  Yi
an  be  positive  or  negative.
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the  transferred  positions  are  netting  the  ‘‘old’’  ones  (in  the
example  at  a  100%  rate),  in  precisely  the  amount  corre-
sponding  to  the  netting  effect  achieved.  In  summary,  the
12 If b) does not hold, the Member would not be netting. Then36  
Assuming  that  both  CCPs  apply  the  same  margining  policy,
 is  also  the  rate  applied  for  calculating  the  Margins  at  CCP-
;  denoting  by  CMBi the  Margins  to  be  posted  by  Member  i  at
CP-B,  we  have:
MBi =    · |Yi| (4)
Total  Margins  to  be  posted  by  Member  i  before  interop-
rability  are  the  sum  of  (2)  plus  (4):
MTOTi =  CMAi +  CMBi (5)
.2.  Interoperability
f  we  now  suppose  that  CCP-A  and  CCP-B  implement  an  inter-
perability  arrangement,  allowing  their  respective  Members
o  move  positions  from  one  CCP  into  the  other,  Member  i  will
oncentrate  all  its  positions  at  CCP-A,  moving  the  positions
hat  it  previously  had  at  CCP-B  to  CCP-A.
The  position  that  Member  i  transfers  to  CCP-A  from  CCP-B
s  Yi.  Member  i increases  its  position  at  CCP-A  in  this  amount,
iminishing  at  the  same  time  its  position  at  CCP-B  in  an  equal
um.
If we  call  X∗i the  position  of  Member  i  at  CCP-A  after
nteroperability,  we  have:
∗
i =  Xi +  Yi (6)
Obviously,  the  position  of  Member  i  at  CCP-B  after  inter-
perability  is  zero:
∗
i =  Yi −  Yi =  0 (7)
And  Margins  to  post  at  CCP-A  by  Member  i  after  interop-
rability,  denoted  by  CMPAi are:
MPAi =  CMPTOTi =    ·
∣∣X∗i
∣∣ =    · |Xi +  Yi| (8)
We  can  make  two  additional  simplifying  assumptions:
a)  After  interoperability,  Members  concentrate  all  their
clearing  activity  on  the  CCP  where  they  had  the  bigger
position  before  such  facility  was  implemented.
)  Members  only  undertake  the  transfer  of  balances  from
one  CCP  to  the  other  if  it  allows  them  to  net  offsetting
positions.
These  two  assumptions  applied  to  the  case  of  Member  i
ean  the  following:
a) |Xi| ≥ |Yi|
) |Xi +  Yi| = |Xi| − |Yi| =
∣∣X∗i
∣∣
And  substituting  b)  in  (8),  we  get:
MPAi =    ·
∣∣X∗i
∣∣ =    · |Xi| −    · |Yi| (9)
Expression  (9)  is  no  more  than:MPAi =  CMAi −  CMBi =  CMPTOTi (10)
In  (10),  we  have  made  use  of  (2)  and  (4).  The  meaning
f  this  expression  is  straightforward:  after  interoperabil-
ty,  Total  Margins  to  post  by  a  Member  making  use  of  the
ransfer-of-positions  facility  are  the  difference  between
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uch  Member’s  Margins12 at  the  bigger  CCP  minus  its  Margins
t  the  smaller  CCP.
On  top  of  posting  its  position-related  Margins  according
o  (10), after  interoperability  Member  i  will  have  to  con-
ribute  to  ﬁnancing  its  pro-rata  part  of  the  Interoperability
argin.  Denoting  by  IOPM  the  total  Interoperability  Margin
o  be  funded  by  all  the  Members,  and  expressing  by  ˛i the
raction  of  the  Interoperability  Margin  that  has  to  be  funded
y  Member  i,  we  have  the  following:
i = CMP
A
i∑
CMPAi
(11)
Obviously,
∑
˛i =  1.
Once  the  allocation  fraction  for  each  Member  is  deﬁned,
he  actual  amount  to  ﬁnance  by  each  of  them  is  simply:
i ·  IOPM  (12)
Total  Margins  to  post  by  Member  i  after  Interoperabil-
ty,  denoted  by  CMPTAi ,  are  the  sum  of  the  position-related
argins  (9)  plus  the  allocation  of  the  Interoperability  Mar-
in  (12). Note  that,  as  Member  i  is  only  clearing  with  CCP-A
fter  Interoperability,  Margins  at  CCP-A  are  the  same  than
otal  Margins,  because,  as  a  consequence  of  Interoperabil-
ty,  Member  i  no  longer  maintains  a  position  at  CCP-B  nor
as  to  post  any  Margins  at  this  CCP.
MPTAi =  CMPTTOTi =  CMPAi +  ˛i ·  IOPM  (13)
Making  use  of  (10), Eq.  (13)  can  also  be  formulated
MPTTOTi =  CMAi −  CMBi +  ˛i ·  IOPM  (14)
Finally,  to  compare  Margins  before  and  after  the
mplementation  of  the  Interoperability  arrangement,  and
enoting  by  DiTOT the  difference  in  Margins  after  minus  Mar-
ins  before,  i.e.  expression  (14)  minus  expression  (5)  yields
he  result:
TOT
i =  CMPTTOTi −  CMTOTi =  ˛i ·  IOPM  −  2  ·  CMBi (15)
In  words,  after  Interoperability,  Member  i will  concen-
rate  all  its  positions  at  CCP-A.  As  a  consequence,  it  will
ave  a  difference  in  Margins  that  can  be  positive  or  nega-
ive,  depending  on  the  relative  size  of  the  allocated  part
f  the  Interoperability  Margin  and  on  the  double  of  Margins
reviously  posted  at  CCP-B,  the  CCP  it  is  no  longer  using.
Savings  in  collateral  for  Member  i  are  twice  the  Margins
hat  it  was  posting  at  the  smaller  CCP  before  interoper-
bility.  This  result  is  quite  intuitive:  one  source  of  savings
omes  from  the  fact  that  Margins  at  CCP-B  do  not  have  to  be
osted  any  more,  because  the  position  has  been  transferred
o  CCP-A.  The  Member  also  saves  Margins  at  CCP-A,  becauseMPA
i
would be equal to CMTOT
i
, and Member i would not save any
ollateral. As interoperability implies the need to ﬁnance the Inter-
perability Fund, it would mean that Member i was consciously
aking the decision to raise its own consumption of collateral.
hus b) can be considered an assumption of Member i’s rational
ehaviour.
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transfer  of  positions  generates  double  savings,  one  at  each
CCP,  in  one  case  because  the  position  disappears  and  in  the
other  because  of  netting.
On  the  other  hand,  Member  i  will  have  to  ﬁnance  its
allocated  part  of  the  Interoperability  Margin.  This  comes
as  a  negative  effect  of  interoperability.  The  ﬁnal  result  for
Member  i will  depend  on  the  combination  of  these  two  com-
ponents.
At  this  stage,  not  much  can  be  said  about  the  ﬁnal  impact
on  Member  i’s  Margins,  without  making  more  assumptions  on
the  values  (or  their  distribution)  of  the  different  variables
involved.  In  any  case,  from  (15)  it  stands  out  that:
•  The  bigger  the  position  at  CCP-B  (where  the  Member  had
its  smaller  position),  the  bigger  the  saving  of  collateral.
•  The  smaller  the  Interoperability  Margin,  the  bigger  the
saving  of  collateral.
•  The  smaller  the  allocation  quota  (˛i)  of  the  Interoperabil-
ity  Margin,  the  bigger  the  saving  of  collateral.  At  the  same
time,  ˛i is  a  function  of  the  netting  achieved  by  Member
i,  expressed  in  the  ﬁrst  point  of  this  list.
•  Obviously,  even  if  Member  i is  not  making  use  of  interop-
erability,  it  will  still  have  to  ﬁnance  its  allocated  part  of
the  Interoperability  Margin:  the  second  part  of  (15)  will
be  zero,  but  the  ﬁrst  part  will  have  a  positive  value.
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